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Online seit:
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Fri Sep 4 00:28:23 1998
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To the District Court
Lübeck
13 January 1997
2a Kls (29/96)
In the criminal case
against
Mr. Safwan Eid
with reference to the interrogation of the witness Mrs. Agonglovi following explanation according to § 257 StPO is given in the name of the defence:
In spite of the efforts of the prosecution to question the credibility of the witness Agonglovi, following is to be recorded:
As already stated in the numerous questionings and interrogations of the preliminary proceedings the witness also confirmed in the main proceeding, that there, where the prosecution wants to have the source of the fire appointed to support the statement of the witness Leonhardt, there was no fire. The witness stated very clearly, that there were no flames close to her door, and that she neither noticed fire nor a reflection of fire.
Fire or the glow of fire the witness noticed at the end of the hall on the first floor, and that there where the hall is broader, which means close to the staircase. The witness specified her observations by not being able to say if she saw fire or the reflection of fire through the hall window-pane or in the hall.
The fact that the witness was not wearing her glasses, when she, as she stated, stuck her head out of the door, does not change anything. Because the witness is short-sighted. Would there have been a fire at the left or right side or opposite her room door, which would mean in direct surroundings, then, as she confirmed, she would have had to notice it.
So far as to the statements of the witness. A comment, though, is still necessary on the questioning of the witness through the representatives of prosecution. In the hearing of evidence, so far, it was judicial manner to make reserved use of the of the legal possibility to reject questions. The defence thinks this is correct, as the right of questioning is an elementary right in the realisation of sharing the judicial right of collecting evidence.
Not only in this proceeding, but on principle, the defence is in support of the manner not to restrict the right of questioning, i.e. to approve to all questions asked, which are, in the widest sense, of any interest to the case. This, of course, also includes questions concerning the credibility of the witness.
Though, at the same time, in spite of the regulation of §68a StPO, limits must be set, which, out of respect for the personality of the witness, should not be neglected without necessity. Where these boundaries are to be set is a different decision which is to be made for each individual case according to the interests and roles of the particular participants in the proceeding.
What the proceeding representatives of the prosecution did with the witness Agonglovi may not have exceeded the bounds of the StPO, which are quite correctly interpreted broadly, but very well, though, exceeded the bounds of decency.
To find out if our client, Safwan Eid, caused the fire, it can not be relevant to find out if the children of Mrs. Agonglovi descend from one, or two, or three different fathers. The defence also doesn't understand of what relevance it is if another witness had varying visits from men or not, and if she had a steady boyfriend at the same time, or before, or afterwards.
Such questions would be understandable if the aim of the prosecution was to find possible suspects. This, though, was and is evidently not the aim of the prosecution, key-word Grevesmühlen.
What, then, is the intention of the prosecution by intruding into the very personal sphere of witnesses?
It cannot be the interest in clarifying facts, as such questions do not help clarify facts. The credibility of witnesses, also that of female witnesses, can be clarified and checked by other, less prejudiced, questions. Therefore, there must be some other intention.
Taking one look into the investigation files and the methods of interrogation used by the members of the SoKo in the questionings of the inhabitants of the house, offers explanation. As for Grevesmühlen one always has an argument at hand to invalidate existing suspicion, for the inhabitants of the house, though, exactly the opposite is the case: Every not immediately understandable details, every different behaviour, every indication of a possible breaking of rules is seen to be suspicious.
Did you hit your son? Did Safwan Eid want to sell a car? Did Makodila arrange the car deal? With which of his brothers did Ray enter the Federal Republic of Germany?
The representatives of the prosecution continued with their form of questioning Mrs. Agonglovi, which runs like a red thread through the proceeding files: Only insufficiently striving for a minimum of knowledge about the living conditions of refugees in the Federal Republic of Germany, there is a poking and searching for non-typical, different, - for this proceeding irrelevant - breaking of rules, for all those sorts of indications which, in the end, could allow the comment: They are capable of having done it.
Which indications do you have, that the Nazis did it?
This question, asked by prosecutor Bieler resuming a statement made accordingly by the witness Agonglovi in the preliminary proceedings, reveals better than all other the intention of the prosecution in this proceeding.
Seen within the context it was quite clear that the witness was declaring her conviction, her opinion, when she said it was the Nazis against the asylum-seekers. Just before she had said that she had no enemies, the attack was not directed against her person (meaning herself in person), one should stop searching for the guilty in the row of the house inhabitants.
Which answer did prosecutor Bieler expect? That the witness would say that she saw the Nazis committing the crime? Hardly. After all the witness had said up until then in the preliminary proceedings made it clear that, in the strict judicial sense, she had no real indications for such a statement. What did Mr. Bieler expect. That the witness would give up her opinion and say that it wasn't the Nazis after all? Or does the prosecution, by referring to the fact that she confirmed her opinion, want to shatter the credibility of the witness according to the not yet proclaimed assessment-of-evidence-regulation: Whoever believes that the arson on 18.1.96 in Lübeck was committed by right-wing extremists is not credible. Whoever believes that it could have been Safwan Eid or, alternatively, a different inhabitant of the house is credible?
After this questioning of the witness Agonglovi by the prosecution one can be curious about the assessment of evidence by the prosecution.
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