September 2, 2002 Prepared by the Andean Information Network Coca Growers Decide to Impede Eradication in the Chapare On August 10, the Six Coca Growers' Federations voted to begin to actively impede forced eradication efforts in the Chapare. The decision reflects the group's growing frustration with the continued militarization of the region, in spite of the MNR's campaign promise to remove the armed forces from the region and indignation for the Chipiriri confrontation that occurred in early August. During the second half of this month, self defense groups became active and blocked remote paths and roads in the Carrasco Federation, near Ivirgarzama, in Ibuelo and in the Tropico Federation. According to Hernan Caprirolo, Joint Task Force commander, the troops have been withdrawn from conflictive areas and are awaiting orders from the executive branch. Tensions High — Climate Ripe for Conflict In spite of this statement, a violent clash was narrowly avoided on August 21 in the Dorado Chico community (Centrales Unidas Federation). At approximately 8:30 a.m. a group of coca growers attempt to chase Joint Task Force eradicators out of the region. Intervention by the Chapare Human Rights Ombudsman convinced both parties to retreat. The Joint Task Force plans to re-enter the region at any time. Heavy rains temporarily impeded both eradication and vigils, but violence may erupt at any time. There are preliminary reports of a confrontation this morning in which security forces detained several coca growers. On August 28, the Joint Task Force attempted to resume eradication in Dorado Chico. The forces clashed with coca growers who tried to impede them. During the ensuing confrontation 15 coca growers suffered multiple contusions and five people were detained. The Joint Task Force troops command decided to move the mobile camp to another region after the intervention of Monsignor Tito Solari and the Human Rights Ombudsman's Chapare representative. On Saturday, August 31, Coca growers' representatives informed that 12 military transport trucks had entered San Andres in the Chimore Federation, Casimiro Huanca's community. Union leaders stated that they had surrounded the camp to impede eradication efforts. The situation continues to be extremely tense. Press accounts state that coca growers also forcibly entered an alternative development office. (La Razon 9/2/02). We have not yet confirmed this information. Initially coca growers' union leaders stated that Evo Morales had authorized the use of force. Morales quickly refuted these statements, highlighting contradictions between Morales's political stance as head of the MAS opposition block in Congress and his role as union leader. Representatives of the Catholic Church, Human Rights Ombudsman's office, and the Permanent Human Rights assembly have urged both sides to resolve their differences peacefully. High- Ranking US Officials Pressure for Continuity in Antidrug Programs A week after attending Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada's inauguration, U.S. Drug Czar John Walters stated during a White House press conference that, 'Any nation dedicated to drug trafficking suffers from the destruction of its democracy, the destruction of its economic prosperity and of its hope for future prosperity. Drug dealers make false promises. It's a lie, it's a nightmare, and it's something that you can't get away from. It deforms people, countries and institutions.” (Los Tiempos, 8/14/02)” Walters' strong comments reflect the Bush Administration' strong push for continuity in antidrug programs initiated by the previous Bolivian administration. On August 12, Gen. Gary Speer, Southcom commander, met with Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and newly-appointed military commanders. Presidential spokespeople stated that the visit was a routine meeting and that they are frequent. They denied that Speer's main objective was to discuss the role of the Bolivian military in anti-drug efforts. The commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, Gen. Roberto Claros stated that the meetings permit 'the continued implementation of bilateral cooperation, carried out within the framework of the new defense and security policies.” During this two day visit, Speer evaluated Bolivian military training programs. According to the Bolivian commander, the U.S. has funded international professional military training for many Bolivian officers as well as region exercises. (El Diario 8/5/02) Speer's visit, just four days after renewed violence in the Chapare and clash in the La Paz Yungas led political commentators to speculate that the focal point of the trip was to insure the continued active participation of the Bolivian armed forces in counternarcotic efforts. Both Walters' comment and Speer's visit suggest heavy U.S. pressure. New Coalition Provides Mixed Messages about Drug War The new ruling MNR-MIR coalition continues to give unclear messages to the Bolivian press and people about their antinarcotics strategy. On October 17, government minister, Alberto Gasser, stated that 'I don't think there will ever be zero coca in the Chapare, but we will continue eradication because it is mandated by law.” (Los Tiempos 8/18/02) He also requested dialogue with Evo Morales to discuss how to make alternative development more effective, but stated that Law 1008 dictates norms for interdiction and eradication, and that it must be followed. Morales countered that the Law mandates eradication with simultaneous alternative development (Los Tiempos 8/18/02) He later stated that forced eradication is not permitted by Law 1008. The text of the anti-drug law can be interpreted in several ways. The new administration sustains that Chapare coca is now classified as 'illegal,” which according to article 11, should be 'obligatorily eradicated without any kind of compensation.” Article 10, though, states that the government's goal should be the elimination of 8,000 hectares of 'transition coca”Chapare, Carrasco, Tiraque and Arani Provinces (most of the Chapare) a year. It also states that meeting these goals 'depends on budget resources and agreements and availability of technical support... oriented toward alternative development.” Article 9 states that the Vandiola Yungas, part of the Chapare region is traditional and legal, although forced eradication has consistently occurred there. Debate over the interpretation of the law should continue. Although coca growers and human rights organizations protested Law 1008 aggressively for over 10 years, the modification of the law and massive advances in forced eradication have led these groups to now cite the terms of the law as guarantees. Dionisio Nunez, MAS congressman and Yungas coca growers proposes the approval of 'The Coca Law” to replace Law 1008. Analysts fear though, that any revocation of the anti-drug law could provide an opening for even more extensive eradication. To Demilitarize or Not To Demilitarize, That is The Question The MNR's campaign promise to take the armed forces out of antidrug efforts appears to have been merely electoral rhetoric. After the August 8 confrontation between the Joint Task Force and members of three coca-growing unions near Chipiriri, it became clear that the new government has no intention of lessening the participation of the armed forces. What has varied, though, are the explanations government ministers give for this decision. Immediately after the clash Defense Minister Freddy Teodovich stated that renewed violence made a withdrawal of the military impossible. Apparently, he had pulled rank on government minister, Gasser. He quickly stated that decisions about military participation would be announced by Gasser. During the past two weeks, government spokesmen sustain that there was never a promise to remove the military from the Chapare, and that Goni had only promised to end their participation in interdiction efforts. Ironically, except for limited riverine interdiction and air transport, interdiction efforts have been consistently carried out by UMOPAR, the rural antinarcotics police. On August 22, Teodovich proudly told the press that they would demilitarize the Chapare, but that demilitarization doesn't mean that the troops will leave the region. Gonzalo de Lozada's traditional anti-military stance and historical alliance with and preference for the Bolivian police gave the impression that he would quickly attempt to shift the balance of power into the hands of this force. The new government announced that it would consider restructuring because, according to Teodovich, 'the creation of the Expeditionary Task Force, paid by the U.S. government and the policing role of the military with their participation in internal conflicts provoked the need to reevaluate in some levels of the military command. Some officers fear that a reorganization plan could include the replacement of a significant portion of military personnel in the Defense Ministry with civilians. (La Prensa 8/10/02) These statements gave the initial impression that the MNR/MIR government would begin to restrict the participation of the armed forces in police work. A combination of factors, including intense U.S. pressure, the new coalition's weak political mandate, as well as increasing criticisms of corruption, inefficiency, and bureaucratic top-heaviness by the Human Rights Ombudsperson, has lead the administration to respect the status quo set by the ADN government. Military Continues In Urban Law Enforcement Military participation in traditional law enforcement functions goes beyond antidrug efforts. On August 22, Bolivian military began to patrol the streets of Santa Cruz as part of a four month emergency 'citizen security plan.” (Opinion 8/17/02) Military security will soon expand to Cochabamba and La Paz. The previous administration frequently used military and military police to patrol urban areas, schools, and parks. . On August 26 the government announced a new 'Joint Task Force” to patrol urban areas (La Prensa 8/27/02). In addition, private security companies, several hundred alone, are requesting permission to use firearms. As a result of the current economic crisis, crime has become more violent. The National Police force complains that it lacks necessary funding to function. A study carried out by the Human Rights Ombudsman's office demonstrates, though, that the budget for this institution has greatly increased during the past several years, yet the police efficiency has continued to deteriorate. As result the use of the military and private security companies for law enforcement has received considerable public support. In spite of the popular approval, the combination of different forces, public and private, has already sparked conflict between the groups. In addition, private security groups have started to pressure the government for permission to carry firearms. The great majority of these groups have refused to register with the police, although they are required to do so by law. The proliferation of different groups in law enforcement continues to generate greater violence and insecurity, especially when they reject government control. Return of the Expeditionary Task Force? Although the U.S. discontinued funding for this irregular group on July 31, it is unclear whether the force or a similar group will function again in the Chapare region. When asked about of the Expeditionary Task Force, Teodovich said that the irregular group would be reactivated if Gasser authorized it. It remains unclear whether this comment reflects a clear plan to renew the forces' operations or the new minister's inability to distinguish between the Joint Task Force, which remains in charge of eradication and the ETF. It is important to note that at this time small security patrols are stationed at each former ETF base and soldiers are repairing rooftops and other infrastructure. Although significant construction on the Ninth Army Division base began over six months ago, the Bolivian government only announced these improvements on August 25. District Attorneys Investigate Ramon Perez Shooting After Almost a Year Chapare district attorneys and a representative from the Attorney General's office carried out a reconstruction of the shooting of Ramon Perez, the coca grower shot and killed by a member of the Joint Task Force on September 27, 2001. The event received press coverage as a result of the participation of the five journalists that were accompanying Perez when he was killed. Press accounts stated that the investigation is a direct result of U.S. congressional pressure and that U.S. funding would be retained if the process is not concluded, an important advance. The reconstruction of events appears to be a formality, though. One Chapare prosecutor complained that the representative from Sucre was too closely aligned with the government to be objective. Furthermore, prosecutors only solicited medical certificates and other documentation two days before the event. At this time, the district attorney's office has not investigated the Chipiriri conflict. Prosecutor Daniel Humerez refused to visit the area, stating he feared for his personal safety although Human Rights' Ombudsman Godofredo Reinicke and union leaders offered to escort him. Humerez made strong statements to the press about the incident, without any investigation. Conflict on the Horizon in La Paz Yungas During the past year, Yungas coca growers voluntarily eradicated only 46 hectares to receive direct economic compensation. COFECAY, the umbrella organization of Yungas coca growers' federations have vowed to oppose eradication in any form. COFECAY leader, Dionisio Nunez, is now a MAS congressman and will be likely to coincide with resolutions made by Chapare coca growers. In spite of opposition in Yungas and failure of the eradication program, government minister, Alberto Gasser sustained that eradication will continue to be voluntary.” We are going to respect legal coca in traditional zones. We won't touch a single leaf. If there's excess coca, we will enter in dialogue and come to consensus on eradication.” He estimates that there are approximately 2,000 hectares of excess coca beyond the 12,000 permitted by Law 1008. U.S. estimates are higheroften 4,000-5,000 hectares of excess coca in the region. Gasser plans to convince Yungas coca growers to eradicate voluntarily by convincing them that alternative development can be effective by 'showing them so that they know they can benefit from it. We have to make alternative development an instrument that benefits the populations using imagination and a great deal of talent” (La Razon 8/22/02). Eradication and alternative development in the Yungas is not as clear-cut as Gasser suggests. There is no clear delineation by Law 1008 to determine which coca is traditional and which is excess. Government officials may attempt to divide and conquer coca producers in the region, protecting coca from loyal groups and slating opposition groups' fields for eradication. Yungas farmers already complain about the lack of markets for alternative crops, such as coffee. The new administration's conciliatory stance appears to be an attempt to avoid prolonged conflict in the region. In June 2001, Yungas residents violently opposed the entry of troops to carry out eradication. The government signed an agreement that only voluntary eradication would occur. In spite of the threat of renewed violence, U.S. pressure to enter into the Yungas continues. There has been a recent wave of press coverage of key drug buts and the discovery of maceration pits. Gasser stated that the FELCN discovers an average of three to five pits a week. (La Razon). The increased press appears to be an attempt to create public concern about drug production in the region and sway public opinion against COFECAY. It is probable that forced eradication will begin in the La Paz Yungas within the coming year. Conclusion Although the new government affirms that it continues to study how the previous administration implemented Plan Dignidad to develop its own counternarcotic strategy, key elements of the ADN plan will remain, largely as a result of U.S. pressure. Forced, uncompensated eradication through militarization persists, in spite of electoral discourse to the contrary. Continued militarization has provoked the outrage of coca growers who are rapidly returning to organized resistance, similar to the 2001-2002 conflict. The social pressure cooker in the region could cause violence to explode at any time. Executive Branch efforts to enter into limited dialogue with coca growers and MAS's legislative efforts to hold newly appointed ministers accountable have done little to diffuse growing tensions. In spite of a history of narco-scandals, the MIR party has taken control of key antidrug vice ministries, such as alternative development and social defense (the Bolivian drug czar post). Friction between the MNR and MIR has been evident since inauguration day. Minister of the Presidency, MNR member Carlos Sanchez Berzain stated that it is clear that the two parties had been 'fighting for 30 years,” creating widespread skepticism about the viability of the ruling coalition. Goni's appointment of at least four indigenous or indigenist representatives to high posts, including Esther Balboa, Mallku's presidential candidate (Education Vice Minister, and Marcial Fabricano (leader of Eastern indigenous groups) has not significantly increased the administration's legitimacy. It's capacity to resolve brewing social conflicts, including both coca growing regions and a large landless peoples' group (Movimiento Sin Tierra) should prove to be extremely restricted.
Bolivia | IMF Struggles | www.agp.org (archives) | www.all4all.org