The access to the Presidency of Venezuela (1999) by Hugo Chávez was a an undoubted legitimate, constitutional and electoral act

The following are rough lines that could explain through times what were the strong reasons that allowed Chávez to become President: 1) We faced a real invalidation of the traditional parties' leadership performance; these parties had been acting since 199. The parties did not renew themselves and were exhausted when facing the qualitative and quantitative change experienced by the Venezuelan people. 2) There was evidence of the lack of a real and effective strategy when fighting against corruption. 3) The public administrative structures reached higher peaks of inefficiency in their duty to satisfy the most pressing expectations and needs of the people, generally, and more specifically, of those of the poorest.

In order to win, Chávez, as a candidate, made use of a frank, direct language, one of recriminations of the past, openly challenging the establishment showing himself as the champion of the poor, supported on a manipulated call to the image of Simón Bolívar.

Chávez effort was centered on showing the differences between two sides of Venezuela: one of those who have nothing and another of the supposedly rich, the powerful. To the former he promised power. With him, they would be the power. To the latter he pledged to oust them from power.

In his effort, and still then in an unclear way, he was not refused the support of the owners of important media, of determining banking sectors, and of most influencing representatives of the domestic industrial sector.

2.

Hugo Chávez thus became the hope of a possible change. His option and his subsequent victory represented a definite break with the process and the constitutional way set for more than 40 years. As soon as inaugurated, he backs his promise: he calls for a referendum, he calls for a constituent power; a new Constitution is drafted and adopted. He then begins to really perform government centered in a single person, something that never been seen before. In his words "he brings a new foundation to the Republic", with the appearance of a fully legitimated government, yet whose Executive Power leads, controls or intervenes clearly and repeatedly the Legislative, the Judicial, the Controlling body and the Office of Public Prosecution.

3.

Once elected President, Chávez makes use of most coherent communication strategy: without intermediation of institutions, he takes for himself the role of the great communicator, a direct one, in order to show that, now, the power is some sort of a marriage of people and army, while shaping a new republic domestically, and a new leadership in the continent.

The most obvious signs are quickly identified and recognized by analysts and scholars: a new government has taken shape, one that is autocratic, authoritarian, populist, militarist and highly inefficient when performing and executing public policies.

4.

Every opinion poll carried out during the years 1999 and 2000 (Venezuela has qualified public opinion research companies) shows a sustained popular support of between 60 and 70% favorable to the President.

5.

Having a stronghold on power and with tangible results in his populist communication scheme, Chávez disqualifies the political parties, he swears to destroy the federation of labor unions -"it is illegitimate", says he" -; he calls the business leadership "rotten centers of power"; he attacks the Catholic Church leadership, linking its members to evil ("they carry the devil under the cassock", said he on one occasion); and he calls for initiatives turning Government into an interventionist factor in private education's schemes and contents.

6.

We thus see the beginning, during the third year of his term, of his first failures in his quest to impose himself on said institutions, The Church responds strongly. It becomes impossible for him to oust the chairman of the workers' federation of unions who, strikingly roots himself more strongly in his office. And, in one extreme, the middle class and the lower middle class feels that with the Presidents' proposals in the field of education he was "meddling with their children". The first street rallies against him appear.

The President does not modify his style. He does not call for a dialog, He does not recognize any institutions, He keeps on disqualifying and insists on a positioning as a ruler supported by the conceptual abstraction of "People-Armed Forces".

7.

Simultaneously he embarks on inexplicable and reiterated voyages throughout the world, traveling to such far places as China, going through forums and meeting with Heads of State in Europe several times, and taking Cuba as his most preferred place. As on December 2002 -four years after his inauguration-, in spite of the fact that he is the President of the of the most trusted country as to the security of energy supplies has been impossible for him to get a private meeting with the U.S. President.

December 2001: the first national strike against him, one lasting just one day. It was a successful strike that united workers with businessmen and allowed the opposition "to discover certain strength an political presence in itself". However, president Chávez does not interpret said action by the country and, responding, he points to and reinforces his original style, repeatedly calling the year 2002 as "the year of his revolution's consolidation".

In doing so, the most representative elements are the transfer of highly ranked military officers to public administration duties; the allocation of huge fiscal resources to social programs managed by the Venezuelan army; the open fostering of an absurd confrontation with the media; and, pathetically, to travel throughout the world.

8.

The economic indexes are beginning to show the results: there is an increase in the population's poverty levels, unemployment reaches figures never seen before and the currency is devaluated in more than 100%, all of it during a period when Venezuela is benefiting from high profitable levels in the price of oil.

Late in 2001 the opinion polls and research show a significant deterioration in the President's popular support. Below 50%.

9.

The first quarter of 2002 shows a period in which the Venezuelan middle class and working class discovers "the streets" as a permanent tool for participation and claims. It is in this period that, to say in one way "there is no more fear and apathy is left behind" The streets of Caracas are no longer for the exclusive use of the "chavistas".

10.

In order to fully understand from abroad Venezuela's political fact, under any circumstance or stage of its history, it is essential that one accepts and understands its condition as an oil country. Venezuela is oil. Faced with a reaction by highly qualified workers of the country's main industry, president Chávez in a nationwide press conference, announces in an autocratic and challenging manner the firing of key men and women of the industry.

This fact boosts the rallies being held, reaching the fatidic march of April 11. The greatest concentration of people ever seen in Venezuela, one that, according to international analysts, is among the most concurred in the Latin American continent.

At the end of the march tens of Venezuelans die from the fire of pro-government sharpshooters and gunmen. This generates disobedience and reactions within the Armed Forces. Their High Command asks Chávez's resignation. He accepts, in principle, he is detained and transferred. A business leader becomes President of the Republic. Yet terrible political and operational errors lead to Chávez's return to power three days after.

He turns his return into a triumph of the people. "It is the people who rule. I am just the people's tool. It was the people who rescued me", he repeats. Once again in power he deepens his non-recognition of the other institutions, he increase the aggressions against the media, the church and the unions.

The opposition sectors, however, learn their lesson: they do not abandon the streets. The marches and rallies are repeated and the number of people in them grows.

Eight months after the massacre, the government actions have prevented, both at the level of Parliament as in the participation of international bodies, the creation of an investigation level ""Truth Commission"). Total impunity.

11.

The polls keep giving their figures: popular support of the President becomes a minority, It reaches 30%, then 20% and now, in December, 2002 it is within a maximum range of between 15% and 17%.

12.

The opposition. Another determining factor in order to get a feeling of what is Venezuela's current reality is to understand "what or which is the opposition" in Venezuela. Prior to the arrival of Chávez, the opposition in the country was a matter for the political parties. That reality enters a terminal crisis with the striking political and electoral victories of the President between the years 1998 and 2000.

Nowadays, the opposition is a quite atomized range of leaders and managers of what is left of the traditional parties, of recently created political groups, of labor and business leaderships and emerging representatives of what is called the "civil society". Next to them, one observes the performance of the media, especially the country's main television channels and newspapers.

During these four years, the Venezuelan opposition has not found within itself "a potion of leadership" that may lead it and represent it and that may facilitate a direct confrontation with Chávez. However, it was indeed able to create a level of contact and coordination in what is known as the "Democratic Coordinating Body" (some 40 people).

The legitimate and necessary political confrontation is not yet seen in parliament, in electoral initiatives, in forums in negotiation tables. Confrontation between government and opposition occurs in TV screens and, directly in the streets.

13.

Such a dynamics leads to obvious consequences in a government that is autocratic and populist by definition: the President definitely looses all institutional support, he looses the spontaneous presence of the people in the streets (he is bound to make use of fiscal resources and buses to hold rallies, as well as to allow impunity when faced with violence), corruption grows openly, especially that linked to the Armed Forces, and parliament (the National Assembly) and the Office of the Attorney General are held mute, without institutional performance.

The O.A.S. Secretary, César Gaviria, is able to play a mediator role in the crisis and a "Negotiation Table" is set-up, formed by six Venezuelans for each of the two sectors: government and opposition, Gaviria decides to set himself on a full-time basis in Venezuela. After eighteen (18) sessions of this table, little or nothing has been reached concretely.

14.

After the sad incidents of April, two key facts occur: 1) the highest and most qualified leadership of the Armed Forces declares itself in "civil disobedience" and take a square in Caracas, from where they have not left in six weeks. Other groups of generals recur before the Supreme Tribunal of Justice and this instance declares them not guilty of the criminal charges brought against them by the Government. These two facts make the President extremely angry. And, for the first time he insults the Justices of the Supreme Tribunal. 2) The head of the unions' federation performs a lead role and with the federation of businessmen, the support of the media and the surprisingly high level of participation of the common citizen organizing itself through hundreds of NGOs, calls for a fourth national strike for December 2.

President Chávez once again underestimates and disqualifies this new call. Unexplainably, action by the National Guard against civil society stimulates the strike, allowing and this allowed the correction of the initial errors made. On the fourth day, at a rally in Eastern Caracas, there is an attack against peaceful demonstrators, with a toll of three dead (a girl in her teens, an old lady and a university professor) and 20 wounded.

In the midst of the strike, an extremely significant action takes place; Chávez attacks again the oil industry's employees and fires key managers. The reaction is immediate, Not less than six thousand of the highly qualifies employees of the industry meet in an assembly (December 12) and decide not to return to their jobs until president Chávez leaves,

15.

Venezuela, thus, lives something never experienced before: its oil industry, the fundamental basis of its income, paralyzed for 12 consecutive days. The Venezuelan oil corporation is the 4th or 5th largest in the world. Extraction had never stopped in Venezuela during its 53 years of oil history. The crisis gets now a geopolitical nature.

Venezuela produces as an average some 2.8 million barrels a day. The production, refining, loading and departures and arrivals of ships, the generation of gas and petrochemical products hardly reach more than 20% of the daily production. The striking sector talks of representing 90% of the workers and point out that the generation of gas and gasoline being produced shall be maintained in order to support the country's electric energy system and basic services, All the Venezuelan cargo fleet has laid anchors offshore, refusing to move, with its captains and crews on board. The world's largest refinery is located in Venezuela -"Paraguaná"- and an Army General replaced its Director.

The White House, today Friday 13, issues for the first time a statement on what is happening in Venezuela. It points out that Venezuela's problem must be solved by the Venezuelan themselves through anticipated elections, While this occurs, the proposal brought by the Venezuelan ambassador at the O.A.S, as to what is occurring in Venezuela is rejected by its Permanent Council. As yet it is not possible to assess this decision's domestic and international impact.

16.

Objectively, one may affirm that president Chávez holds to power only by one of the following reasons: 1) because there has not been an armed reaction by the military; 2) because his openly autocratic and "caudillo-way" performance prevent him from acting as a head of state when facing an institutional crisis: from negotiating, from talking or resigning. The unions' sector, the business sector, the Church, the political parties in their majority, the organized civil society, the media oppose him actively and openly. Add to this a definitely paralyzed oil industry and the people constantly present on the streets.

17.

What happened? President Chávez defrauded a great hope. He turns the nation's dream (1998) into a great fraud (2000-2002). He dilapidated in no more than 36 months the greatest and most solid popular support that any Venezuelan president had in the past. He had a legitimate origin yet his performance is not legitimate (Democratic Chart, OAS). His conduct does not go beyond reflecting the performance of an improperly formed military officer, with scarce intellectual and ethical conditions and -in the opinion of specialists- with obvious emotional conflicts.

18.

What is to come now? The president is a prisoner of his own words. The unions' leadership swore not to give up until Chávez is ousted or until elections are called for the first quarter of 2003. The oil industry is not generating a single barrel of oil for export, and oil exports are the fundamental source of the country's economic existence. The people opposing the regime are in the street, announcing once more "The taking of Caracas, the greatest ever held rally". Parliament (the clearest political scenario) is subordinated to the president's orders. The military component is subordinated is still a mystery. The president's followers take the streets under processes of induction and guidance, not spontaneously, and with reiterated showings of aggressiveness and violence.

It is impossible to give a prediction based at least in days. Each hour counts, each action modifies the scenario.