Comments on Genoa in WTO-related Conference Call, July 31, 2001

Walden Bello, Focus on the Global South

(The following is an expansion of various interventions I made during the conference call of activists organizing around the WTO on July 31, 2001. I would like to thank all participants in the call for the stimulating exchange of views.)

Let me say, first of all, that I think the organizers of the Genoa Social Forum did an excellent job getting all those people there and managing the protests. This was the biggest anti-corporate globalization mobilization so far. One can only appreciate their achievement if we understand the great constraints they were under, including the lack of cooperation from the police and the national government, and even from the regional government, which dragged its feet providing the promised conference facilities and translation services.

Police on the Offensive

My sense is that the difference between police behavior in Genoa, compared to that in earlier big mobilizations - Seattle, Washington, DC, Melbourne, Chiang Mai, Prague (I wasn't in Quebec) - is that in Genoa, the police were in an offensive mode whereas previously, they were, though in many instances brutal in their behavior, largely in a defensive mode. The preemptive attack on the peaceful march at the Corso Torino, over three kilometers away from the wall of steel around the Palazzo Ducale area, illustrated this. I think that the choice of strategy was not fortuitous. There has probably been some consultation going on among police forces internationally, some coordination, especially since the global elites are now greatly worried about these protests.

Denunciation and fraternal criticism

I agree that our thrust should be to denounce the police and the state, who were the principal instigators of violence in Genoa. Indeed, Genoa can be described as a police riot. I also don't think it's appropriate to denounce people who say they are on our side but with whom we may have disagreements over tactics. But although there is oftentimes a thin line between denunciation and critical analysis, I think that we should be free to analyze and issue fraternal criticism of groups that say they are on our side when that isnecessary.

Provocateurs: not a homogeneous group

I agree that many of the provocateurs were police. The visual evidence gathered so far by the Genoa Social Forum confirms this. However, I think it would be a mistake to say that all of them were police. There were others who were not under the control of the state and acted the way they did out of belief or ideology. To erase this distinction is to open ourselves to illusions that will damage our capacity to deal with future contingencies. Since there is a great deal of sensitivity to the names we use for such political groupings, I will use the term « Bs.»

No to Parasitical Tactics

If the Bs want to violently engage the police, that's one thing. We may deplore this but we can't do a thing about it. What is crucial for me is that they confine the confrontations to themselves and the police, and operate politically and physically at a great distance from us. It is when they use our non-violent mass mobilizations for their own ends that I draw the line. In Genoa, a tactic I often observed was the Bs would stay at the edges of the march and from there provoke the police by throwing rocks at them. The police would invariably respond by lobbing tear gas at our ranks, creating disorder and confusion and causing injury to our people. This is a parasitical mode of operating that also preempted in many instances our people's plans to stage peaceful mass civil disobedience actions.

Please don't misunderstand. I am not referring to the angry responses that our people displayed in response to the police's preemptive attacks during the first day. It was very understandable that lots of people who were in the Corso Torino area threw rocks at the police, oftentimes in a defensive response to unprovoked police attacks. No, I am referring to the deliberate way the Bs, especially on the second day, would provoke the police by creating disturbances ahead of the front ranks of the big march, like burning cars, or staying on the outer perimeters of our ranks and, through rock throwing or window-breaking, provoke police to attack us from the side and from behind - which the police was only too happy to do. This happened again and again and again.

I emphasize this not just out of concern over the image of violence and confusion that such actions created and associated with an otherwise impressive show of peaceful protest. It was also a question of physical security. It was simply irresponsible to provoke a police attack on thousands of people that were marching closely packed in a narrow boulevard. The dangers of a stampede were really very great that second day, and this would have been disastrous had one occurred. It is testimony to the discipline of our people that they did not break ranks and run in panic when they were gassed. I think they realized that stinging eyes and difficulties in breathing had to be endured because the alternative was worse. Whatever his or her ideology, anybody who deliberately exposes masses of people to such dangers is acting in a criminal fashion.

There were marshals who were tasked with protecting the people from the police and provocateurs during the march. For the most part, they did an admirable job though they were overstretched. They kept the ranks calm when it became very tempting to cut and run. It is admirable, too, how ordinary marchers took things in their own hands. Several times, when some Bs would want to smash a window or overturn a car, groups of marchers would plead with them not do it. Sometime moral suasion worked. Sometimes it did not.

Denial or Preparation?

I think that given the high visibility they achieved in Genoa, it would be na?ve not to expect the Bs to descend in force on the next big mobilization. We can either go into the next one in a state of denial or we can be prepared.

First of all, I think that we should not be intimidated by either police or Bs but resolve to make the next anti-corporate globalization protest the biggest and most militant ever.

Second, we should expect the police to be on an offensive mode, to break up our capacity to deploy civil disobedience, and to turn us from disciplined marchers into an angry mob acting in a disorganized fashion. People should be organized for orderly retreats, swift advances, and disciplined resistance. This is not to militarize our demonstrations; it is simply to make them more organizationally effective in communicating our message to the world under the conditions of the new offensive strategy of the police.

Third, we must find a way of dealing with the Bs, whom we can expect again to cling to our ranks to achieve their objective of provoking violent confrontation. I think that we need to devise a strategy of neutralizing them. I would recommend five steps:

1. Initiate dialogue in the planning for the mobilization with the more open, honest, and trustworthy B groups with the intent of getting them to agree to respect the political and ethical parameters of our mass actions;
2. Organize our ranks so that teams can be deployed when needed to engage in peaceful moral suasion of Bs engaged in violent activity;
3. In the event this does not work, work out orderly ways of putting as much physical and political distance between our ranks and the Bs in confrontation situations; and
4. In the event this fails, to work out and deploy non-violent methods of restraining and defusing violent behavior.

Let me just say that unless measures such as these are incorporated into our preparations, there might be many among us who would find it difficult to wholeheartedly mobilize people for the next mass action. Without such measures, I would think twice before exposing people to the dangers of stampede, panic, and uncontrolled rage that could have broken out at any moment in Genoa, with incalculable consequences.

In conclusion, let me say that the other side--the pro-globalist political and economic elites - is now on the defensive. For all our problems, we must remember that Genoa was a big setback for the G-8. Our movement now has the moral ascendancy. We cannot afford to lose it. And one of the reasons we continue to have it is that we have continually learned from both our successes and our mistakes. Genoa yielded new challenges. I am confident that we will meet those challenges head on.